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It is well known that Americans of the founding era venerated the 
rights of property owners.  Property rights were closely linked with individual 
liberty.1  Clearly, one of the principal objectives of the Framers was to 
enhance the security of private property.2 
Yet the historical relationship between property rights and free market 
values is elusive and warrants careful exploration.  How did the concept 
of economic liberty impact the framing of the Constitution and Bill of 
Rights?  To what extent did the Framers embrace economic freedom and 
embody this concept in the Constitution?  These are not easy questions 
to answer.3  Not only is the historical record sparse, but it is unlikely that 
the Framers as a group shared the same outlook.4  Moreover, economic 
liberty is a concept with different shades of meaning.  Generalizations 
must be approached with caution. 
Despite these caveats, in this paper I will examine the growing support 
for both the ideology and practice of economic liberty in the founding 
era.  By the late eighteenth century, Americans were increasingly challenging 
British imperial governance, as well as long-accepted governmental 
regulation of the economy.  I argue that by the time of the Constitutional 
Convention in 1787, the growing commitment to a market economy was 
eclipsing the older mercantilist regime as the dominant paradigm in 
political culture, and that this development in turn influenced the process 
of constitution drafting. 
I.  THE MERCANTILIST BACKGROUND 
To appreciate the emergence of economic liberty, we should briefly 
consider the legal and economic landscape of England in the sixteenth 
 
 1. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 26–58 (3d ed. 2008); JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 27–33 (2d ed. 
1993); Walter Dellinger, The Indivisibility of Economic Rights and Personal Liberty, 
2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 9, 19 (“Economic rights, property rights, and personal rights 
have been joined, appropriately, since the time of the founding.”). 
 2. Stuart Bruchey, The Impact of Concern for the Security of Property Rights on 
the Legal System of the Early American Republic, 1980 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1136 
(“Perhaps the most important value of the Founding Fathers of the American 
constitutional period was their belief in the necessity of securing property rights.”). 
 3. For a discussion of the link between the Constitution and capitalism, see 
Bernard H. Siegan, One People As to Commercial Objects, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 101, 101–19 (Ellen Frankel Paul & 
Howard Dickman eds., 1989). 
 4. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: 
THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 14–16 (2002) (discussing 
difficulties in determining the intent of the Framers and pointing out that “the evidence 
of the original intent will often be fragmentary, unreliable, and conflicting”). 
ELY.FINAL.DOC 10/14/2008  12:00:03 PM 
[VOL. 45:  673, 2008]  Economic Liberties 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 675 
and seventeenth centuries.5  Under the prevailing doctrine of mercantilism, 
government played an active role in regulating commerce and stimulating 
economic growth.6  The objective of the mercantile system was to increase 
national wealth by controlling the economy and securing a favorable 
balance of trade.7  Mercantilism encompassed a scheme of tariffs, subsidies, 
grants of monopoly, and numerous regulations of private enterprise and 
private bargaining.8  The English colonists of the seventeenth century 
brought with them the legal norms and assumptions of the mother country.  
Although the economic conditions of North America were much 
different than those of England, colonial lawmakers imitated the English 
practice of marketplace regulation and promotion.9  Moreover, as a practical 
matter, the precarious existence of isolated North American Colonies in 
the seventeenth century reinforced the perceived need for governmental 
control of economic life. 
A glance at the colonial statutes and ordinances of the seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuries demonstrates the pervasive concern of lawmakers 
with economic regulation and protection of the supply of basic necessities.  
Following the pattern in England, the colonists sought to regulate the 
labor market.  In addition to wage controls, there was comprehensive 
legislation governing slaves, indentured servants, and apprentices.  Likewise, 
colonial lawmakers made repeated efforts to control the quality and price 
of goods and services.  For example, the price and weight of bread was 
subject to widespread regulation throughout the Colonies.10  Local 
pricing regulations sometimes also covered meat and beer.11  Grist mills 
and ferryboats were treated as types of quasi-public enterprises, and tolls 
for their services were set by law.12  The fees of attorneys, as well as 
licensing requirements to practice law, were similarly fixed, a reflection 
 
 5. For a discussion of mercantilism and economic policy in England, see 
RICHARD B. MORRIS, GOVERNMENT AND LABOR IN EARLY AMERICA 1–54 (1946); JON C. 
TEAFORD, THE MUNICIPAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 3–15 (1975). 
 6. MORRIS, supra note 5, at 1–2. 
 7. Id. 
 8. For a treatment of mercantilist ideas and actions, see LARS MAGNUSSON, 
MERCANTILISM: THE SHAPING OF AN ECONOMIC LANGUAGE 1–173 (1994); D.C. Coleman, 
Mercantilism Revisited, 23 HIST. J. 773, 773–91 (1980). 
 9. See infra notes 51–109 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra notes 54–81 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra notes 82–90 and accompanying text. 
 12. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 38 (3d ed. 2005); 
Raymond E. Hayes, Business Regulation in Early Pennsylvania, 10 TEMP. L.Q. 155, 
171–72 (1936). 
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of popular animosity toward the legal profession.13  Laws to license and 
regulate peddlers were common.14  From England, the colonists adopted 
intensive regulation of tavern operations.15  These laws required that 
tavern keepers be licensed annually and fixed the charges for food, drink, 
and lodging.  Colonial legislators widely enacted usury laws patterned after 
English rate ceilings to hold down the rate of interest in the hope of 
encouraging trade and settlement.16  Yet many Colonies set the limit 
higher than the prevailing rate in England in an effort to encourage 
investment from abroad.17  Agriculture was also subject to legislative 
oversight, particularly with respect to staple crops.  Regulation of export 
trade was designed to maintain the quality of commodities, and thus to 
enhance the reputation of staple products from the Colonies in overseas 
markets.18  The Maryland and Virginia legislatures, for instance, imposed 
controls on the production and sale of tobacco, and sought to halt the 
export of unsound tobacco.19  Pennsylvania enacted numerous laws 
governing the export of wheat, flour, and meat.20  Similarly, South 
Carolina regulated shipments of indigo abroad.21  This sketch of colonial 
economic regulations is far from complete, but it does suggest a 
commitment to mercantilist policies and a distrust of economic 
liberty and open competition. 
My focus is upon colonial market regulations, but it is important to 
bear in mind that the colonial economy developed under the auspices of 
the British imperial system.  Mercantilist theory held that Colonies existed 
primarily to benefit the mother country.22  For much of the seventeenth 
century, however, England largely ignored the fledgling North American 
Colonies.  This period of neglect changed following the Stuart Restoration.23  
Parliament imposed new controls designed to bind the Colonies more 
 
 13. CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 41–42, 53, 112 (1911). 
 14. Hayes, supra note 12, at 169. 
 15. See infra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 16. James M. Ackerman, Interest Rates and the Law: A History of Usury, 1981 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 61, 85. 
 17. Id. 
 18. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 40–41 (discussing colonial efforts “to keep . . . 
staple crops under some kind of quality control”); Hayes, supra note 12, at 161–62 
(discussing export controls designed to maintain Pennsylvania’s reputation abroad). 
 19. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 40. 
 20. Hayes, supra note 12, at 159–62. 
 21. ELY, supra note 1, at 21. 
 22. KERMIT L. HALL & PETER KARSTEN, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 43 (2d ed. 2009). 
 23. For the impact of the Restoration on the Colonies, see generally WESLEY 
FRANK CRAVEN, THE COLONIES IN TRANSITION, 1660–1713, at 1–103 (1968). 
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closely within the imperial framework.24  The Navigation Acts sharply 
curtailed freedom of trade by requiring that goods imported to the 
Colonies must pass through England.25  Because direct importation from 
continental Europe was prohibited, the manufactured goods purchased 
by the colonists were largely made in England.  Further, most raw 
materials exported from the Colonies could be shipped only to England.26  
Although these trade restrictions gave the Colonies privileged access to 
the English market, they made the Colonies dependent on the mother 
country for manufactured goods.  Over time, the Navigation Acts shackled 
colonial economic ambitions and engendered ill-feeling toward England.27  
One goal of the American Revolution was to overthrow these controls 
on the colonial economy and achieve economic independence.  “It was a 
commercial restriction which caused the revolution,” the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court recalled in 1853, “and injuries to our trade which 
produced the subsequent war against England . . . .”28 
On paper, at least, many facets of colonial economic life appear to 
have been closely regulated.  One would certainly be hard pressed to 
picture colonial Americans as adherents of a strict laissez-faire philosophy.  
Indeed, several scholars have suggested that colonial economic controls 
anticipated later New Deal regulatory programs.29 
II.  THE RISE OF ENTREPRENEURIAL LIBERTY 
How, then, can one maintain that the founding generation valued 
economic liberty?  Several factors point in this direction.  We should 
start by stressing the living law rather than focusing on a list of 
legislative rules.  There is room to doubt the efficacy of colonial 
regulatory measures.  Colonial governments were feeble institutions that 
 
 24. HALL & KARSTEN, supra note 22, at 18 (observing that “the restored Stuart 
monarchy in England wished to knit the colonists more fully into the fabric of the 
empire”). 
 25. OLIVER M. DICKERSON, THE NAVIGATION ACTS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
7–9 (1951). 
 26. For the operation of the Navigation Acts, see DICKERSON, supra note 25, at 3–
30; CRAVEN, supra note 23, at 33–37; Nuala Zahedieh, Making Mercantilism Work: 
London Merchants and Atlantic Trade in the Seventeenth Century, 9 TRANSACTIONS 
ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y (6th ser.) 143, 144 (1999). 
 27. ELY, supra note 1, at 18–19. 
 28. Sharpless v. Mayor of Phila., 21 Pa. 147, 170 (1853). 
 29. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 40 (suggesting that colonial regulation of 
staple crops foreshadowed New Deal farm programs); Hayes, supra note 12, at 155 
(tracing regulations of New Deal era to Pennsylvania colonial laws). 
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lacked a strong revenue base and supervisory officials.  It followed that 
enforcement mechanisms were lax and compliance with controls often 
limited.30  A few examples illustrate the gap between legislative policy 
and economic reality.  Usury laws were easily evaded and likely had 
little impact on ordinary credit relationships.31  Tavern regulations are 
another case in point.  One scholar declared: “Taverns are clearly the 
number one exhibit in early America of a local business regulated by 
government. . . .”32  Nonetheless, Virginia tavern regulations were widely 
ignored, and local officials did little in response to chronic complaints 
about overcharging.33  The very fact that legislators so frequently altered 
and amended regulatory legislation gives rise to an inference that prior 
controls had proven ineffective.34  In sum, a focus solely on the formal 
law may yield a false measure of the amount of economic liberty in the 
colonial world. 
Aside from regulatory failure, larger economic trends strengthened 
colonial receptivity to greater market freedoms by the late eighteenth 
century.  During the eighteenth century, the Colonies experienced rapid 
population growth, economic expansion, and an increase in the standard 
of living.35  As the Colonies matured and grew prosperous, the perceived 
need for comprehensive economic regulations gradually lapsed.  A 
flourishing Atlantic trade brought ever more colonists into a market 
economy.36  In a world increasingly shaped by opportunity rather than 
 
 30. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 39 (“[T]he people who ran the colonies had very 
little in the way of tax money, or staff, at their disposal.”). 
 31. HENRY W. FARNAM, CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF SOCIAL LEGISLATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES TO 1860, at 88–91 (1938); Ackerman, supra note 16, at 61, 85 (noting 
that colonial usury laws “seem to have been widely evaded”). 
 32. Paton Yoder, Tavern Regulation in Virginia: Rationale and Reality, 87 VA. 
MAG. HIST. & BIO. 259, 273 (1979); see also MORRIS, supra note 5, at 21 (“In the 
Southern colonies the setting of tavern rates was the most consistent example of price 
regulation undertaken by the county or sessions courts right through the Revolutionary 
period.”). 
 33. Yoder, supra note 32, at 266–78 (noting numerous complaints about illegal 
rates as well as lapses in the licensing process); HALL & KARSTEN, supra note 22, at 42 
(pointing out that local officials often ignored tavern regulations “they perceived as 
unimportant or unenforceable”). 
 34. E.A.J. JOHNSON, AMERICAN ECONOMIC THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH 
CENTURY 142–43 (photo. reprint 1961) (1932) (“Very often [economic regulations] 
failed in their purpose; in fact, the necessity of their re-inactment [sic] is proof of their 
evasion.”). 
 35. Marc Egnal, The Economic Development of the Thirteen Continental Colonies, 
1720 to 1775, 32 WM. & MARY Q. 191–222 (1975).  See also GORDON S. WOOD, THE 
RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 169 (1991) (pointing out that in the colonial 
world of the 1760s and 1770s, “[f]or most white Americans there was greater prosperity 
than anywhere else in the world”). 
 36. JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN 
VISION OF THE 1790S, at 40–41 (1984). 
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scarcity, many colonists relied on individual initiative and private 
bargaining, and saw the regulatory regimes of the past—both imperial 
and domestic—as an impediment to their economic ambitions.37 
Of course, this change of attitude did not occur abruptly, but the 
impact of the new outlook was clear by the time of the founding.  At 
first, few questioned the right of government to control economic activities, 
but many increasingly doubted the wisdom of such regulations.  In time, 
however, some took the next step and challenged the authority of 
government to supervise economic exchanges in a free market.  To trace 
this evolution, let us consider several aspects of the colonial economy. 
III.  WAGE CONTROLS 
The origins of wage regulation in the Colonies can be found in the 
English Statute of Laborers (1350) and the Statute of Artificers (1563).38  
The first of these measures, passed in response to the labor shortage 
caused by the Black Death, sought to compel work at pre-plague 
wages.39  This legislation was replaced by the Statute of Artificers, under 
which justices of the peace were empowered to determine wages 
annually for each county.40  It bears emphasis that these laws were framed 
in large part to hold down wages.41  Thus, employment relationships in 
the English tradition were governed by regulatory regimes rather than 
contracts between employers and workers.42  This reflected lingering 
medieval notions of a static society in which one’s place was fixed by 
birth and status. 
The English policy of regulating wages was transported to the 
Colonies.  Throughout much of the seventeenth century, the Colonies—
especially in New England—experimented with wage controls.43  There 
was initially no objection to the principle of wage regulation.44  
Conditions in colonial America, however, were radically different than 
in England, and did much to undermine wage controls.  The bulk of the 
 
 37. Id. at 28–39. 
 38. John V. Orth, Contract and the Common Law, in THE STATE AND FREEDOM OF 
CONTRACT 44, 50–53 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1998). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 51. 
 41. Id.; see also MORRIS, supra note 5, at 19. 
 42. Orth, supra note 38, at 50–51. 
 43. MORRIS, supra note 5, at 55–91; FARNAM, supra note 31, at 57–60. 
 44. Id. 
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labor force consisted of self-employed farmers.45  Relatively few people 
worked for wages, and they could in most cases easily obtain land of 
their own.46  Free labor was therefore both scarce and mobile.  The chronic 
shortage of labor explains the heavy colonial reliance on an unfree work 
force composed of slaves, convicts, and indentured servants, but it also 
rendered futile legislative attempts to cap wages for free labor.  Market 
pressures simply drove wages higher despite statutory ceilings.  Historians 
agree that efforts to limit the cost of labor in the colonial era were a 
failure.  Lawrence M. Friedman has aptly noted: “Wage-price regulation 
was virtually abandoned by 1700.”47 
In its place there developed a system of labor relations in which wages 
were determined by market forces and bargaining.  Earlier wage 
regulations were either repealed or ignored.  In their study of wage 
controls in Massachusetts, Richard M. Morris and Jonathan Grossman 
concluded: 
But all signs point to the disintegration in the eighteenth century of the general 
scheme of wage-fixing in Massachusetts, despite the fact that the basic system 
embodied in the Codes of 1648 and 1660 remained on the law books unrepealed.  
The absence of extensive regulatory codes, considered in conjunction with other 
factors, is evidence of the breakdown of mercantilism as a system of internal 
regulation and of the rise of laissez-faire practices in industry and commerce 
considerably before the Revolution.48 
By the end of the seventeenth century, the intermittent interest in wage 
controls withered in other Colonies as well.49 
Notwithstanding archaic wage controls embodied in law, in reality a 
wage labor market grounded on contracts emerged by the eve of the 
Revolution.  Individuals were free to pursue their own interests and to 
bargain over wages.  One prominent scholar observed: “In colonial 
times, in areas or during periods in which the regulation of wages was 
not a matter of public concern, the wage rate was determined by a 
bargain between employer and employee.”50  Thus, the law of employment 
was transformed by the collapse of wage regulation and the growth of 
free contract ideas. 
 
 45. Egnal, supra note 35, at 200–01 (“Farming was the most important colonial 
occupation, and was the chief employment of between 80 and 90 percent of the working 
population.”). 
 46. FARNAM, supra note 31, at 57 (“The people who worked for wages were not 
numerous enough to constitute an important class, and the ease with which land could be 
obtained, as well as the great difficulty of obtaining labor in a new country, made them 
independent.”). 
 47. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 43. 
 48. Richard B. Morris & Jonathan Grossman, The Regulation of Wages in Early 
Massachusetts, 11 NEW ENG. Q. 470, 498 (1938). 
 49. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 43. 
 50. MORRIS, supra note 5, at 208. 
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IV.  PRICE REGULATIONS 
Colonial lawmakers also adopted pervasive schemes of price regulation, 
covering the sale of a wide range of products.  Such legislation harked 
back to the medieval notion of a just price, under which considerations 
of fairness and customary pricing could trump the right to charge market 
prices.51  Price controls reflected thinking molded by an economy of 
scarcity. 
The story of colonial price regulations is more complex than that of 
wage controls.  Not only did pricing controls reach a large variety of 
commodities, but price regulations persisted longer than those governing 
wages.52  As late as 1763, for example, the Common Council of New 
York City enacted a detailed schedule setting “reasonable prices for all 
sorts of Victuals.”53  In short, attempts to fix prices did not collapse as 
abruptly as the efforts to hold down wages.  Nonetheless, by the late 
eighteenth century, the ideology of economic liberty made steady inroads 
on price fixing regimes.  I will examine this process by concentrating on 
regulations dealing with the price of bread and meat. 
No transaction was regulated more closely and for a longer time than 
the sale of bread.  Following the practice in England, colonial localities 
from Boston to Charleston were typically authorized to establish the 
assize of bread during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.54  Under 
the assize, the price and weight of bread was fixed in accordance with 
the price of flour.55  The set price varied for different kinds of bread.56  
Bakers were required to mark their bread, and those who failed to meet 
the weight and price specifications were subject to a fine and seizure of 
their bread.57  The purpose behind the assize of bread was to protect the 
 
 51. JOHNSON, supra note 34, at 123, 139, 221. 
 52. Still, it is noteworthy that efforts of colonial officials in Virginia to limit trade 
and set maximum prices were unpopular and controversial in the seventeenth century.  
William E. Nelson, Authority and the Rule of Law in Early Virginia, 29 OHIO N.U. L. 
REV. 305, 355–57 (2003). 
 53. THOMAS F. DEVOE, THE MARKET BOOK: A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC MARKETS 
IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK 140 (photo. reprint 1969) (1862). 
 54. For the assize of bread, see generally FARNAM, supra note 31, at 107–12; see 
also MORRIS, supra note 5, at 161–66; 1 WILLIAM G. PANSCHAR, BAKING IN AMERICA: 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 26–27 (1956). 
 55. FARNAM, supra note 31, at 107–12. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
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public from the perceived abuses of bakers.  The New Hampshire 
legislature explained in 1766 that the assize was needed because 
a just Proportion between the Price of Flour and the Weight and Price of Bread 
is now a Matter of Importance as many People purchase the greatest part of 
their Bread of Bakers and without such Regulation they are left to Judge for 
themselves where their Impartiality will be much Questioned . . . .58 
As this statutory language suggests, the assize was usually justified in 
terms of greedy bakers and vulnerable customers. 
As might be expected, efforts to enforce the assize of bread proved 
difficult.  Starting in the early seventeenth century, bakers often protested, 
arguing that the set price was inadequate and that they should receive 
greater return for their labor.  Philadelphia bakers in 1751 asked to be 
freed from the assize of bread.59  Bakers succeeded from time to time in 
obtaining upward adjusted prices for bread.60  To add muscle to their 
complaints, bakers periodically resorted to strikes.  As early as 1659, 
bakers in New York City refused to bake until local officials raised the 
prices for bread.61  There was also a short-lived work stoppage in 1741.62  
Likewise, bakers in Charleston stopped baking in November of 1786, 
complaining about an insufficient price under the assize.63  Nor were 
consumers entirely happy.  There were frequent charges that bakers were 
ignoring the assize and charging market prices.  Clearly, the assize of 
bread had become highly contentious by the end of the eighteenth 
century.64 
Bakers increasingly demanded not just higher price schedules but an 
end to municipal regulation of prices.65  As the ideology of economic 
liberty gained ground, the days of the assize of bread were numbered.  
Baltimore and New Haven decided not to control the price of breadstuffs.66  
In December of 1792, Philadelphia and Boston bakers petitioned the 
legislatures of Pennsylvania and Massachusetts to end regulations on the 
 
 58. An Act to Regulate the Price & Assize of Bread, 6 Geo. 111. Orig. Acts, vol. 
5, p. 83; recorded Acts, vol. 3, p. 11; N.H. Province Laws 387 (enacted Jan. 16, 1766). 
 59. 1 J. THOMAS SCHARF & THOMPSON WESTCOTT, HISTORY OF PHILADELPHIA, 
1609–1884, at 245 (1884). 
 60. MORRIS, supra note 5, at 161–62. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 162–65. 
 63. LEILA SELLERS, CHARLESTON BUSINESS ON THE EVE OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 23–24 (1934). 
 64. MORRIS, supra note 5, at 161 (“Relations between the public authorities and 
the bakers were frequently tense, and at times culminated in actual strikes of master 
workers.”). 
 65. TEAFORD, supra note 5, at 94–95. 
 66. Id. 
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price and size of bread.67  They argued that competition would better set 
prices than any assize.68  After consideration, the Pennsylvania legislature in 
1793 suspended the assize of bread.  The lawmakers noted concerns 
about whether the assize “infringe[d] the equality of rights established 
by the constitution of this commonwealth.”69  Four years later the assize 
law was repealed, marking an end to bread price regulations in 
Pennsylvania.70  One scholar concluded that in Pennsylvania, “it was 
then deemed unconstitutional for the state to limit prices” aside from 
monopolies.71 
The campaign to eliminate the assize of bread in New York City is 
especially illuminating.  By the 1790s, bakers were petitioning the common 
council, not simply to adjust bread prices, but to end regulation altogether.72  
“Influenced by the burgeoning capitalist economy and freer economic 
attitudes of the early national period,” one scholar has maintained, “they 
deemed it grossly unfair for their profession to be singled out for income 
limitation.”73  In 1800, the city responded to this demand by abolishing 
bread price regulations.74  A decision by the common council to reinstitute 
the assize in October of 1801 prompted a work stoppage by the angry bakers.75  
An attempt by investors to organize a corporate bread enterprise—The 
Bread Company—added to the controversy.76  What is striking, however, is 
the extent to which the idea of economic liberty was at the center of the 
ensuing debate.  One defender of The Bread Company insisted: “No 
mechanic should be restricted in his profits by any power—it is 
 
 67. DUNLAP’S AMERICAN DAILY ADVERTISER, April 4, 1793; Richard C. Bull, The 
Constitutional Significance of Early Pennsylvania Price-Fixing Legislation, 11 TEMP. 
L.Q. 314, 318–19 (1937). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Act of Sept. 4, 1793, ch. 1702, 14 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA 
FROM 1682 TO 1801, at 510 (James T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders eds., 1909). 
 70. Act of Apr. 1, 1797, ch. 1947, 15 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA 
FROM 1682 TO 1801, at 510 (James T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders eds., 1911). 
 71. Bull, supra note 67, at 319. 
 72. Howard B. Rock, The Perils of Laissez-Faire: The Aftermath of the New York 
Bakers’ Strike of 1801, 17 LAB. HIST. 372, 374–75 (1976).  The New York bakers 
protested repeatedly during the 1790s that the price of flour and the wages of employees 
had risen considerably while the price of bread was limited.  Petitions of Bakers (Jan. 20, 
1789, Nov. 4, 1792, June 22, 1793, Mar. 25, 1795) (on file with author and on file with 
the New York City Department of Records and Information Services). 
 73. Rock, supra note 72, at 374. 
 74. Id. at 375. 
 75. Id. at 376. 
 76. Id. at 378–85. 
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fundamentally contrary to every principle of Justice, and it strikes at the 
root of industry.”77  The Bread Company failed, and the bakers continued to 
press for repeal of the assize.78  Individual bakers, invoking free market 
principles, occasionally defied the municipal regulations.79  In 1821, 
New York City finally abandoned price controls on bread.80  Although a 
hardy survivor of mercantilist policy, the assize was a belated casualty of 
new economic thought.81 
The cost of meat was also controlled from time to time, but not with 
the same regularity as bread.  There is evidence that attempts to fix the price 
of meat ran into the same combination of practical and philosophical 
objections that undercut the assize of bread.  Consider the experience of 
New York City.  In 1763, toward the end of the French and Indian War, 
there were complaints about the high cost of commodities and calls for 
price regulation.82  In response, the common council attributed the high 
prices to “the avarice” of suppliers.83  It set a schedule of “reasonable 
prices” for a wide variety of meat and fish, including beef, pork, veal, 
lamb, and chicken, all sold in the public market.84  Farmers and butchers 
were outraged by these price regulations.85  Many halted meat sales in 
the city, and offered to sell provisions at points outside municipal 
jurisdiction.86 
But the most salient aspect of this controversy for our purposes was 
the explicit appeal to principles of economic freedom as a basis to 
challenge price controls.  Describing themselves as “friends to the liberty of 
Englishmen,” a number of farmers and butchers boldly asserted: “We 
thought we were born free Englishmen, and had the liberty, as such, to 
sell our own effects at our own liberty.”87  Moreover, some butchers openly 
defied the law and sold at market prices.88  Reflecting a gradual shift in 
attitude, the butchers now called for a free market in provisions.89  
 
 77. Id. at 384. 
 78. Id. at 385. 
 79. Id. at 385–86. 
 80. Id. at 387. 
 81. Id. at 384; see also PANSCHAR, supra note 54, at 27 (pointing out that “the 
bread laws became less severe both in scope and impact as the 18th century drew to a 
close,” and asserting that “a growing spirit of free competition tended to make such 
measures obsolete”). 
 82. DEVOE, supra note 53, at 139–40. 
 83. Id. at 140. 
 84. Id. at 140–45. 
 85. Id. at 145. 
 86. Id. at 145–47. 
 87. Id. at 147. 
 88. Id. at 148–49. 
 89. Id. at 149–50. 
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Following a familiar pattern, city officials found a temporary solution by 
raising the set prices of meat to appease the butchers.90 
V.  PUBLIC MARKETS 
Closely allied to price regulation was the establishment of public 
markets in colonial cities.91  Drawing upon long-settled English practice, 
lawmakers sought to organize and control private trading.  As one scholar 
noted, “Farmers entering the larger towns encountered regulations which 
considerably abridged their freedom of marketing . . . .”92  Market regulations 
prescribed the time and place for trade, banned buying and selling 
outside the market, and mandated the use of standard weights and 
measures.  Thus, all sellers and prospective purchasers were brought 
together in one place.  The clerk of the market supervised operations, 
sought to maintain quality control of commodities sold in the market, 
and endeavored to eliminate fraudulent practices.93  Municipalities 
rented stalls in the market to sellers.94  To protect this regulated market, 
municipalities commonly legislated against forestalling and engrossing.  
Forestalling was the practice of purchasing commodities on the way to 
market with the intention of reselling at a higher price.  The practice of 
engrossing was the purchase of a large amount of a particular commodity in 
the hope of increasing its price above the market level.95  It was thought 
that such activities raised prices without providing a service and that 
they threatened to monopolize the supply of commodities.96  The 
purpose of establishing public markets was to provide the urban population 
 
 90. Id.; see also MAX GEORGE SCHUMACHER, THE NORTHERN FARMER AND HIS 
MARKETS DURING THE LATE COLONIAL PERIOD 136–38 (1975) (discussing the failed 
attempt to set a comprehensive list of food prices for New York City in 1763, and 
pointing out that “the idea of just price clashed with the rising doctrine of the free 
market”). 
 91. For a discussion of public markets in the colonial era, see CARL BRIDENBAUGH, 
CITIES IN THE WILDERNESS: THE FIRST CENTURY OF URBAN LIFE IN AMERICA 1652–1742, 
at 192–95, 349–53 (1938); FARNAM, supra note 31, at 77–80; ERNEST S. GRIFFITH, 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 144–52 (1938); 
J.R.T. HUGHES, SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE COLONIAL ECONOMY 126–27 (1976); SELLERS, 
supra note 63, at 21–23; TEAFORD, supra note 5, at 39–43, 51–52. 
 92. SCHUMACHER, supra note 90, at 91. 
 93. James W. Ely, Jr., Patterns of Statutory Enactment in South Carolina, 1720–
1770, in SOUTH CAROLINA LEGAL HISTORY 69 (Herbert A. Johnson ed., 1980) 
(discussing public market regulations in Charleston). 
 94. BRIDENBAUGH, supra note 91, at 349–50. 
 95. TEAFORD, supra note 5, at 9–10. 
 96. SCHUMACHER, supra note 90, at 93–94. 
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with equal access to reasonably priced food and other necessities.97  
Public supervision, not free trade by individuals, was the key characteristic 
of these regulated markets. 
Yet during the eighteenth century there was mounting criticism 
directed against municipal controls on buying and selling.  Legislative 
language about the need for regulated markets did not match reality.  
The imposition of market regulations never eliminated all private trading 
elsewhere.98  Many farmers and traders preferred private marketing, 
under which they could sell to customers at competitive prices.99  Complaints 
about higher prices as a result of forestalling and engrossing were 
frequent.  Indeed, it appears that the law against forestalling was frequently 
ignored.100 
Moreover, there was a growing sense of skepticism about the supposed 
advantages of public markets.  Strong resistance to the establishment of 
a public market appeared in Boston.101  Not only did Bostonians worry 
that regulated markets would drive trade to other towns, but they 
expressed concern that such controls constituted “a breach upon their 
natural rights and liberties.”102  Persistent opposition doomed Boston’s efforts 
to maintain a public market system.  In 1737, a riotous mob destroyed 
the municipal market houses.103  Pressure mounted in the 1740s against 
public markets and commodity price fixing in Massachusetts.104  In the 
1760s, Bostonians continued to argue that market controls should “not 
deprive us of the liberty common to Englishmen.”105 
Boston’s staunch resistance to public markets was unique in the 
colonial era.  A number of other cities, from Philadelphia to Charleston, 
 
 97. FARNAM, supra note 31, at 80 (“The colonial laws which established markets 
and fairs were an attempt to organize trade in a general way, so as to assure to all the 
people a fair chance to satisfy their needs.”); GARY B. NASH, THE URBAN CRUCIBLE: 
SOCIAL CHANGE, POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 129–30 (1979) (pointing out that the idea behind public markets was to 
make farm produce available to urban workers at reasonable prices). 
 98. SCHUMACHER, supra note 90, at 94 (observing “that the measures to restrict 
retailers and to concentrate marketing were very frequently violated is clear”). 
 99. NASH, supra note 97, at 130–31. 
 100. There were persistent complaints about forestalling and engrossing.  CARL 
BRIDENBAUGH, CITIES IN REVOLT: URBAN LIFE IN AMERICA, 1743–1776, at 82 (1955); 
SCHUMACHER, supra note 90, at 94; G.B. WARDEN, BOSTON 1689–1776, at 116 (1970). 
 101. TEAFORD, supra note 5, at 40–41. 
 102. Id. at 41; see also WARDEN, supra note 100, at 53 (“The establishment of 
market regulations in itself implied a serious threat to the Bostonians’ freedom of 
economic opportunity.”). 
 103. NASH, supra note 97, at 130–35; WARDEN, supra note 100, at 118–23. 
 104. WINIFRED BARR ROTHENBERG, FROM MARKET-PLACES TO A MARKET 
ECONOMY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF RURAL MASSACHUSETTS, 1750–1850, at 98–99 
(1992). 
 105. TEAFORD, supra note 5, at 43 (quoting BOSTON EVENING POST, Sept. 12, 1763). 
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adopted the public market system.106  In 1763, as part of a comprehensive 
price-fixing scheme, New York City prohibited all selling of many food 
items outside the established market.107  Yet effective enforcement of the 
market laws varied widely, and these regulations likely remained on the 
books long after they had become a dead letter.  One historian persuasively 
concluded: 
The elaborate and detailed regulations which these incursions into economic 
control entailed were never fully successful, even in their heyday.  By 1750 they 
gave very definite indications of cracking under the strain of the mobility and 
stir which had begun to characterize the urban centres of Philadelphia and New 
York.108 
By the eve of the Revolution, he added, “markets were no longer 
exclusive,” and “only the hollow shell of limited trade regulation 
remained.”109  The entrepreneurial spirit had prevailed over mercantilist 
attachment to controlled markets. 
VI.  REAL PROPERTY LAW 
In assessing economic controls in colonial America, historians have 
concentrated upon commercial activity in urban centers.  But colonial 
life was predominantly rural in character.  “Farming was the most important 
colonial occupation,” one study stressed, “and was the chief employment of 
between 80 and 90 percent of the working population.”110  The prospect of 
acquiring land was one of the main inducements for colonists to settle in 
North America.111  Given the availability of land, the vast majority of 
farmers owned land.112  The law of real property was central to colonial 
society in which land represented the primary source of wealth.  Any 
account of the growth of economic liberty, therefore, must take account 
of the law governing real property. 
 
 106. BRIDENBAUGH, supra note 91, at 349–52. 
 107. DEVOE, supra note 53, at 140–45. 
 108. GRIFFITH, supra note 91, at 129. 
 109. Id. at 160; see also HUGHES, supra note 91, at 131 (observing that the system 
of controlled markets “largely passed into history even before the end of the colonial 
era”). 
 110. Egnal, supra note 35, at 200–01. 
 111. ELY, supra note 1, at 10–11. 
 112. WOOD, supra note 35, at 123 (“[M]ost American farmers owned their land.”). 
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English land law provided the basis for colonial landownership.113  In 
England, land was the preeminent basis of wealth and social status, and 
consequently rules governing inheritance were central to English land 
law.114  English law showed a strong preference for maintaining the 
cohesiveness of landed estates over generations.  The most striking expression 
of this policy was the doctrine of primogeniture, under which all land in 
cases of intestacy passed to the eldest male heir.115  This meant that the 
estate would remain intact as one parcel.  Closely related to primogeniture 
was the practice of entailing estates.116  A landowner could provide by 
conveyance that an estate should descend through the family line forever.117  
Thereafter, the owner in each generation obtained what amounted to 
only a life interest in the property.  English law also protected landed 
estates from seizure by creditors.118  This system shielded landholding 
elite from the hazards of enterprise and the vicissitudes of a market 
economy. 
Conditions in North America, however, were very different from those 
in England, and the traditional treatment of land was ill-suited to the 
colonial experience.  Land was scarce in England but abundant in North 
America.  Ownership of land was far more widespread than in England.  
A 1777 pamphlet boasted that Americans were “a people of property; 
almost every man is a freeholder.”119  These differences led to a gradual 
transformation of property law during the colonial era.  Land law reform 
had two primary goals: to overhaul rules of inheritance and to foster the 
free alienability of land.  Both objectives reflected the desire to reshape 
land law in ways consistent with the principle of economic liberty. 
The New England Colonies started the process of dismantling the 
traditional inheritance laws in the seventeenth century.  Primogeniture 
was deeply unpopular as a symbol of the aristocratic land order of 
England.120  New Englanders rejected primogeniture in favor of partible 
inheritance with an equal distribution of property among children upon 
 
 113. RICHARD B. MORRIS, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 73–75 
(1930).  For the English background of colonial land law, see id. at 69–125. 
 114. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 24. 
 115. MORRIS, supra note 113, at 73–81. 
 116. John V. Orth, After the Revolution: “Reform” of the Law of Inheritance, 10 
LAW & HIST. REV. 33 (1992). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See infra notes 132–139 and accompanying text. 
 119. WOOD, supra note 35, at 234 (quoting PA. PACKET, Nov. 26, 1776; S.C. & AM. 
GAZETTE, Nov. 6, 1777). 
 120. Stanley N. Katz, Republicanism and the Law of Inheritance in the American 
Revolutionary Era, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11 (1977) (“For the Revolutionary generation, 
the law of inheritance took on a new, strategic importance, since it appeared to 
symbolize the aristocratic aspects of English government against which the Revolution 
increasingly directed itself.”). 
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death.121  Pennsylvania followed suit.122  Primogeniture and entail existed 
elsewhere in colonial America but were of declining importance.123  
Because colonists had the right to dispose of land by will, landowners 
could readily circumvent primogeniture.124  Entailed estates were impractical 
because they could not be sold or used as the basis for credit.  Thus, the 
practice of entailing stalled economic development.125  Most states 
abolished primogeniture and the fee tail estate at the time of the 
American Revolution.126  Holdings in fee tail generally were converted 
into fee simple estates.127  This change strengthened the rights of current 
owners, who could now transfer the property or incur debts based on 
their holdings.  In short, the abolition of primogeniture and entail promoted 
freedom of testamentary disposition and was consistent with a market-
based concept of property.  Rather than inspiring these changes, the 
Revolution ratified a reform process already underway in the Colonies. 
This sweeping revision of inheritance law reflected new currents of 
thought regarding property.128  First, land should be distributed equally 
in intestacy.  Hence, the elimination of primogeniture encouraged a wide 
distribution of a decedent’s property.  Second, land was valued for what 
profits it could produce, not as a permanent seat of family social position 
and political power.  Entailed estates made no sense in a society that 
treated land as a commodity and in which land speculation and sales on 
the open market were frequent. 
 
 121. George L. Haskins, The Beginnings of Partible Inheritance in the American 
Colonies, 51 YALE L.J. 1280, 1280 (1942). 
 122. Id. at 1280–81. 
 123. Historians have debated the extent to which primogeniture and entailing were 
used in different colonies.  See Katz, supra note 120, at 13 (“Primogeniture did not exist 
in many of the colonies, especially in New England, prior to the Revolution, and it is not 
clear that the use of either primogeniture or entail to restrict the distribution of property 
was widespread.”); C. Ray Keim, Primogeniture and Entail in Colonial Virginia, 25 
WM. & MARY Q. 545 (1968). 
 124. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 30 (pointing out that primogeniture applied only 
to intestate estates, and that landowners could make other arrangements by will). 
 125. Keim, supra note 123, at 585 (concluding that entailed estates prevented land 
speculation and constituted a barrier to obtaining a mortgage or credit). 
 126. FARNAM, supra note 31, at 51–53; Katz, supra note 120, at 11–14; Orth, supra 
note 116, at 33. 
 127. Katz, supra note 120, at 15 (pointing out that the North Carolina legislature 
changed holdings in fee tail to fee simple); MORRIS, supra note 113, at 92–93 (noting 
that most states made the fee tail a fee simple). 
 128. Katz, supra note 120, at 11–29. 
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Allied to revision of inheritance law was the move to facilitate the 
transfer of land.  The colonists developed practices to simplify land 
transactions.  Foremost among these was the system of recording land 
titles.  New Englanders established public recordation in the seventeenth 
century.129  The recordation scheme helped to eliminate confusion and 
dispute over land titles and thus encouraged a market for the purchase 
and sale of land.130  As one historian has noted, rules requiring “inventory of 
estates and recording of land transfers were explicitly designed to 
promote the rise of market capitalism by clarifying who owned what and 
thereby rendering ownership of property secure.”131  At the same time, 
the colonists streamlined deeds and modified the complicated English 
legal procedures to determine ownership. 
Some Colonies also began to modify the English law that protected 
land from the claims of creditors.  A desire to attract credit from English 
merchants prompted these steps.132  In 1700, for example, the Pennsylvania 
legislature enacted a measure which made all the land of a debtor liable 
for debts.133  In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, 
several New England Colonies authorized creditors to take land to 
satisfy obligations.134 
Parliament hastened the process of eliminating the traditional real 
property exemption from claims of the creditors in the Colonies with 
passage of the Act for the More Easy Recovery of Debts in 1732.135  
Reflecting concern by British creditors that colonists were relying on 
English law to frustrate collection of debts, the Act declared that all 
types of property in the Colonies were liable to satisfy debts.136  They 
applied to all debts, not just obligations owed to British creditors.137  As 
a practical matter, the Act likely enlarged the market for land both by 
judicial sale of debtors’ property and by debtors’ voluntary sales to 
satisfy creditors’ claims.  Most states adhered to the policy of making 
land subject to creditors after the Revolution.138  Claire Priest cogently 
concluded: “Another important consequence of the Debt Recovery Act 
was to expand the commodification of land.  Streamlining the procedures 
 
 129. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 27. 
 130. Id. (“But in a new place, where land was a commodity, recording seemed 
necessary—an important tool of the volatile, broadly based land market.”). 
 131. Nelson, supra note 52, at 359. 
 132. Claire Priest, Creating an American Property Law: Alienability and Its Limits 
in American History, 120 HARV. L. REV. 385, 411 (2006). 
 133. Id. at 412. 
 134. Id. at 408–16. 
 135. 1732, 5 Geo. 2, c. 7 (Eng.). 
 136. Priest, supra note 132, at 423–24. 
 137. Id. at 424. 
 138. Priest, supra note 132, at 439–47. 
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associated with the sale of land by execution made it easier and less 
costly for both unsecured and secured creditors to seize land.”139 
By the founding era, land was treated as a market commodity.  
“Family farms,” Gordon S. Wood declared, “were now thought of less as 
patrimonies and more as commodities.”140  Not only was there a large 
market for land, but speculation in undeveloped land was common.  
Both elite figures and ordinary farmers saw speculation as a path to 
wealth.141  “America,” one scholar observed, “witnessed a veritable land 
frenzy in the post-Revolutionary period.  Eighteenth century Americans 
knew that land speculation could be very profitable, and thus nearly 
every segment of society, from the lowly squatter to the largest land 
baron, engaged in the buying and selling of land.”142  Indeed, private 
land companies were organized well before the Revolution to further the 
interests of land speculators in acquiring vast tracts of land.143  As is well 
 
 139. Id. at 458; see also HUGHES, supra note 91, at 124–25 (discussing impact of 
Parliamentary legislation on seizure of land for debt, and declaring “land was in fact 
becoming a pure commodity in America”). 
 140. WOOD, supra note 35, at 128.  See also MARSHALL HARRIS, ORIGIN OF THE 
LAND TENURE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 310 (1953) (pointing out that during the 
colonial era, “land was being looked upon more as a commodity to be sold for a profit 
and less as a family estate to be kept for posterity”); Nelson, supra note 52, at 357 
(observing that land “had become a valuable commodity” in mid-seventeenth century 
Virginia). 
 141. From the seventeenth century, speculation in land was rife in colonial 
America.  See FARNAM, supra note 31, at 32–34 (“Speculation in landed property 
became active in New England.”); SHAW LIVERMORE, EARLY AMERICAN LAND 
COMPANIES: THEIR INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT 27–28 (1939) (discussing 
land speculation in eighteenth century New England); Charles S. Grant, Land 
Speculation and the Settlement of Kent, 1738–1760, 28 NEW ENG. Q. 51, 54 (1955) 
(“Kent emphatically bears out the standard contention on the prevalence of 
speculation.”); John L. Harr, Land Speculation as a Theme in Southern History, 11 
NORTHWEST MO. ST. U. STUD. 1, 4–12 (1981) (discussing land speculation in southern 
Colonies before the Revolution). 
 142. Jonathan J. Bean, Marketing “the Great American Commodity”: Nathaniel 
Massie and Land Speculation on the Ohio Frontier, 1783–1813, 103 OHIO HIST. 152, 
156 (1998).  See also THOMAS PERKINS ABERNETHY, FROM FRONTIER TO PLANTATION IN 
TENNESSEE: A STUDY IN FRONTIER DEMOCRACY 19 (1932) (“Speculation in lands was the 
most absorbing American enterprise during the later Colonial, the Revolutionary, and the 
early Republican periods. . . . [I]n those days, the country was run largely by speculators 
in real estate.”). 
 143. For the role of private land companies, see HARRIS, supra note 140, at 289–
309; ERIC HINDERAKER, ELUSIVE EMPIRES: CONSTRUCTING COLONIALISM IN THE OHIO 
VALLEY, 1673–1800, at 166–69 (1997) (discussing impact of the Illinois Company and 
speculative activity on trans-Appalachian development schemes before the Revolution); 
LIVERMORE, supra note 141, at 74–132. 
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known, many leaders of the Revolutionary cause were active land 
speculators.144  George Washington, for example, was involved in a 
number of speculative land ventures.145 
For Americans of the eighteenth century, land speculation was much 
like participation in the stock market to later generations.  In practice, 
this trading spirit superseded traditional English rules governing land 
ownership and transfer.  The robust buying and selling of land without 
government intervention spoke volumes about the growing sentiment in 
favor of economic liberty.  It is more revealing of economic attitudes 
than waning efforts to enforce obsolete price controls and market 
regulations. 
VII.  THE RISE OF CONTRACT 
As price controls and regulated markets declined and land speculation 
quickened, contracts assumed a greater role in the emerging commercial 
society of the late eighteenth century.  In an expanding economy, 
merchants were more likely to trade or extend credit to persons who 
were strangers.  Under such circumstances, transactions could not safely 
be grounded in trust or custom.  Hence, private bargains in an impersonal 
market were increasingly governed by written agreements.146  Parties 
became accustomed to making deals and looking out for their own 
interests.147  The origins of modern contract law, which developed rapidly 
in the nineteenth century, can be traced to this period. 
Contracts constituted a legal expression of growing free market 
values.  They provided a vehicle by which individualists could bargain 
for their own advantage.  Contractual exchange not only promoted 
economic efficiency, but also underscored the autonomy of individuals.  
 
 144. For example, both James Wilson and Robert Morris were engaged in large-
scale land speculation.  See CHARLES PAGE SMITH, JAMES WILSON: FOUNDING FATHER, 
1742–1798, at 159–68 (1956) (“Almost without exception the Revolutionary leaders 
dabbled in land.”); ELLIS PAXSON OBERHOLTZER, ROBERT MORRIS: PATRIOT AND 
FINANCIER 301–13 (1903). 
 145. See generally CHARLES ROYSTER, THE FABULOUS HISTORY OF THE DISMAL 
SWAMP COMPANY: A STORY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON’S TIMES (1999) (discussing 
Washington’s participation in the Dismal Swamp Company, a failed speculative 
venture); A.M. SAKOLSKI, THE GREAT AMERICAN LAND BUBBLE 4–12 (1932) (discussing 
Washington’s interest in western land). 
 146. BRUCE H. MANN, NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMUNITY IN 
EARLY CONNECTICUT 34–41 (1987) (pointing out that credit transactions in early 
eighteenth century Connecticut were increasingly governed by written instruments); 
DEBORAH A. ROSEN, COURTS AND COMMERCE: GENDER, LAW, AND THE MARKET 
ECONOMY IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 59–62, 83 (1997) (discussing increased use of 
contracts to govern economic relationships in eighteenth century New York); WOOD, 
supra note 35, at 162–63. 
 147. WOOD, supra note 35, at 162–64. 
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Economic rights were the product of private bargaining, not governmental 
authority.  To achieve these goals, the stability of contracts was essential.  It 
was necessary that bargains be honored and not subject to subsequent 
interference. 
Careful studies of several Colonies bear out the growing importance of 
contract law and a free market economy.  William E. Nelson discovered 
that “a vibrant market economy” based on tobacco sales developed in 
Virginia as early as the mid-seventeenth century.148  This robust economy 
“gave rise to complex commercial transactions and commercial 
litigation.”149  Nelson concluded that in Virginia by the 1640s, “the 
hallmark doctrine of market capitalism, that individuals should be free to 
enter into contracts which courts would then enforce, was firmly in 
place.”150 
Similarly, Nelson found that the judiciary in colonial Pennsylvania 
wanted to encourage economic development.  As he explained, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court “wanted to establish rules of law that 
would help entrepreneurs bring business to Pennsylvania and thereby 
develop its economy and bring wealth to its inhabitants.”151  To achieve 
these goals, the colonial judges fixed clear legal rules to govern the 
collection of debts.  In fact, courts in colonial Pennsylvania spent more 
time on debt collection than on any other matter.152 
VIII.  IMPACT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 
The American Revolution produced contrary trends with respect to 
economic liberty.  The outbreak of war with Great Britain disrupted 
long-settled trading patterns and sparked steep inflation.153  Colonial 
currency rapidly lost value.154  In this turbulent situation, a renewed 
regulatory impulse clashed with calls for economic freedom. 
Demonstrating that old patterns of behavior die hard, state lawmakers 
responded to wartime economic upheaval with a program of wage and 
 
 148. Nelson, supra note 52, at 357. 
 149. Id. at 358. 
 150. Id. at 360. 
 151. William E. Nelson, Government by Judiciary: The Growth of Judicial Power 
in Colonial Pennsylvania, 59 SMU L. REV. 3, 35 (2006). 
 152. Id. at 35–37. 
 153. JEROME J. NADELHAFT, THE DISORDERS OF WAR: THE REVOLUTION IN SOUTH 
CAROLINA 155–72 (1981). 
 154. Id. 
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price controls reminiscent of the seventeenth century.155  As might be 
expected, such efforts were largely fruitless.  Outspoken critics attacked 
wage and price controls as both unworkable and as an impairment of 
economic rights. 
To understand these cross-currents, consider the experience of Connecticut 
in the Revolutionary era.  During 1776, legislators passed a number of 
laws regulating prices and wages.156  Late that year, a convention of 
New England states recommended that each state in the region set a 
common price and wage schedule.157  In line with this recommendation, 
Connecticut lawmakers enacted a comprehensive measure that merits 
careful analysis.  The law demonstrated a remarkably unsophisticated 
grasp of the reasons behind the price surge.  It proclaimed that “the rapid 
and exorbitant rise upon the necessities and conveniences of life in this 
day of public calamity and distress is chiefly occasioned by monopolizers, 
the great pest of society, who prefer their own private gain to the interest 
and safety of their country . . . .”158  For good measure, the act further 
stated that “goods in general imported have of late owing to the 
unbounded avarice of some persons been sold by wholesale at the 
exorbitant advance of five and six hundred per cent.”159  Having 
attributed wartime inflation to the greed of individuals rather than 
fundamental causes, the statute set the maximum daily wage for farm 
laborers.160  It also fixed prices for produce ranging from wheat and beef 
to rum and potatoes.161  There were even special schedules for goods 
imported from Europe.162  Violators of the wage and price regulations 
were subject to fines.163  As early as May of 1777, however, lawmakers 
found it necessary to adjust the regulated price for many items, and to 
abandon controls on salt and beef.164 
 
 155. See generally MORRIS, supra note 5, at 92–135, and Bull, supra note 67, at 
319–27, for wage and price regulations of the Revolutionary era. 
 156. MORRIS, supra note 5, at 93–94. 
 157. Id. at 94–95. 
 158. An Act to Prevent Monopolies and Oppression by Excessive and Unreasonable 
Prices of Many of the Necessaries and Conveniences of Life (1776), in 1776 ACTS AND 
LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT IN AMERICA 437 (New London, Timothy Green 
1776). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. An Act in Addition to, and Alteration of an Act of this State, Entitled, An Act 
to Prevent Monopolies and Oppression by Excessive and Unreasonable Prices for Many 
of the Necessaries and Conveniences of Life (1777), in 1777 ACTS AND LAWS OF THE 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT IN AMERICA 457, 462 (New London, Timothy Green 1777). 
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Congress debated the New England price regulation scheme in the 
winter of 1777 and ultimately declined to endorse this program.  Many 
in Congress doubted the practicality of price and wage regulations.165  
John Adams argued that such a scheme “was tried in vain even in the 
absolute government of France.  The high price of many Articles arises 
from their scarcity.”166  In New England, the controls aroused dissatisfaction 
and were deeply unpopular with farmers.167  By the summer of 1777, the 
New England states, including Connecticut, repealed the wage and price 
regulations.168 
Advocates of regulation, however, did not give up easily.  In 1778, 
Connecticut, joined by New York and Pennsylvania, established yet 
another regime of wage and price controls.169  These, too, proved short-
lived.  Congress, in June of 1778, recommended repeal of such regulations, 
reasoning, “[I]t hath been found by Experience that Limitations upon the 
Prices of Commodities are not only ineffectual for the Purposes proposed, 
but likewise productive of very evil Consequences to the Great Detriment of 
the public Service and greivous [sic] Oppression of Individuals.”170  
Given this negative congressional attitude, Connecticut and other states 
promptly repealed their latest wage and price controls.171  To be sure, 
there were persistent efforts throughout the Revolutionary period to fix 
prices at the local level.172  Few modern observers are surprised that 
these Revolutionary attempts to legislate wages and prices were 
fruitless.173  American history is littered with failed efforts to set prices. 
 
 165. MORRIS, supra note 5, at 97–100. 
 166. Id. at 99. 
 167. Id. at 101. 
 168. An Act for Repealing an Act, etc. (1777), in 1777 ACTS AND LAWS OF THE 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT IN AMERICA 473, 474 (New London, Timothy Green 1777). 
 169. MORRIS, supra note 5, at 106.  For the Pennsylvania Statute of 1778, see Bull, 
supra note 67, at 322–23 (pointing out that the Act was suspended and eventually 
repealed without having ever gone into effect).  It is noteworthy that Massachusetts did 
not join in this effort, and did not enact any additional statewide law fixing wages and 
prices for the remainder of the Revolutionary era.  Id. at 322. 
 170. 11 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 569 (Worthington 
Chauncey Ford ed., 1908), available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwjc.html. 
 171. MORRIS, supra note 5, at 107. 
 172. Id. at 109–17.  See also Andrew McFarland Davis, The Limitation of Prices in 
Massachusetts 1776–1779, in 10 PUBLICATIONS OF THE COLONIAL SOCIETY OF 
MASSACHUSETTS 119 (1907). 
 173. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 43 (observing that wage and price regulations 
were “briefly and ineffectively revived during the Revolutionary War, as an emergency 
measure”). 
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What is significant, however, is that arguments against such regulations 
were often couched in terms of economic liberty.  A 1777 writer asserted 
that price fixing “always has and ever will be impracticable in a free 
country, because no law can be framed to limit a man in the purchase or 
disposal of property, but what must infringe those principles of liberty 
for which we are gloriously fighting.”174  In 1778, John Witherspoon 
insisted that “[f]ixing Prices by Law never had nor ever will have any 
Effect but stopping Commerce and making Things scarce and dear.”175  
A year later a number of Philadelphians petitioned the city to end price 
controls, insisting that such regulations infringed the rights of property 
owners by preventing the sale of goods in an open market.176 
In the same vein, Gouverneur Morris, later a member of the 
Constitutional Convention, assailed Pennsylvania’s Revolutionary era 
price controls.  He argued that such regulations were not only foolish as 
a matter of economic policy but also amounted to an invasion of 
property rights.177  The regulation of prices, he asserted, “gave a woeful 
impression of the new governments, by laying down a violation of the 
rights of property as the corner stone on which they were to be erected.”178 
The Pennsylvania Constitution contained a unique provision requiring 
that a Council of Censors be elected every seven years.  The duty of this 
body was to report whether the Constitution had been preserved.  
Invoking the Pennsylvania Bill of Rights that guaranteed “a right to be 
protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property,” the Council 
found in 1784 that market and price regulations were unconstitutional.  
Specifically, the Council declared: 
Some of the acts of assembly, made to prevent forestalling, were also 
unconstitutional invasions of the rights of property. 
. . . . 
It is the opinion of this committee, that the attempts which have been made to 
regulate the prices of commodities, were absurd and impossible.  They tended to 
produce the very opposite effects to those which they were designed to produce, 
and were invasions of the right of property.179 
 
 174. Letter to the Editor, CONN. COURANT, May 12, 1777, at 1. 
 175. Letter from John Witherspoon to William Churchill Houston (Jan. 27, 1778), 
in 3 LETTERS OF MEMBERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 57 (Edmund C. Burnett ed., 1926). 
 176. MORRIS, supra note 5, at 117. 
 177. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 72–74 (1990).  For 
the role of Gouverneur Morris in drafting the Constitution, see generally RICHARD 
BROOKHISER, GENTLEMAN REVOLUTIONARY: GOUVERNEUR MORRIS—THE RAKE WHO 
WROTE THE CONSTITUTION (2003). 
 178. Letter from an American, To the Inhabitants of America, PA. PACKET, Mar. 23, 
1780, at 2. 
 179. THE PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO CALLING THE CONVENTIONS OF 1776 AND 1790, 
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By 1783, then, the property clause of the Pennsylvania Bill of Rights 
was construed to affirm the right of owners to sell their goods at market 
prices. 
I make no claim that Americans of the Revolutionary era were of one 
mind in rejecting wage and price regulations.  Clearly the public was 
divided and advocates of regulations were persistent.  By the same 
token, opponents of regulation gained the upper hand by weaving 
together practical objections and constitutional arguments grounded in 
economic liberty.  Moreover, the debate over wartime controls had a 
lasting consequence.  One result, according to Richard B. Morris, was 
“the crystallization of sentiment” among members of the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787 “in favor of laissez faire policies in the internal 
economic life of the nation.”180  Moreover, opposition to wage and price 
controls was increasingly framed in terms of constitutionally protected 
rights.  In the aftermath of the American Revolution, the distinguished 
treatise writer Thomas M. Cooley observed in 1878, “it has been commonly 
supposed that a general power in the State to regulate prices was 
inconsistent with constitutional liberty.”181 
The dispute over wage and price controls in the Revolutionary period 
lends support to the thesis that Americans of the late eighteenth century 
were increasingly receptive to ideas of economic liberty, but even more 
compelling evidence can be found in early state constitutions.  The 
influential Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776, for instance, declared that all 
men “have certain inherent rights . . . ; namely, the enjoyment of life and 
liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and 
pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.”182  Likewise, the New 
Hampshire Constitution of 1784 stated: “All men have certain natural, 
essential, and inherent rights; among which are—the enjoying and defending 
life and liberty—acquiring, possessing and protecting property—and in a 
 
at 87, 113 (Harrisburg, Pa., John S. Wiestling 1825). 
 180. MORRIS, supra note 5, at 118. 
 181. THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH 
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 742 (4th 
ed. 1878). 
 182. VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § 1, reprinted in 7 THE FEDERAL AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE 
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 3813 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS]. 
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word, of seeking and obtaining happiness.”183  Similar language asserting 
the right to acquire property appeared in several other early state constitutions, 
including constitutions in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania.184  Such 
provisions did more than just secure existing property arrangements; 
they guaranteed the right to obtain property.  Right-to-acquire language 
held out the promise of economic opportunity for all persons.185 
As further evidence of this commitment to economic liberty, states 
took steps to discourage undue concentration of wealth.  The abolition of 
primogeniture and entail has already been considered.  Several state 
constitutions also prohibited grants of monopoly.  The North Carolina 
Constitution of 1776, for example, proclaimed that monopolies “are 
contrary to the genius of a free State and ought not to be allowed.”186  
Along the same line, four state conventions that ratified the proposed 
Federal Constitution urged an amendment barring monopolies.  This 
aversion to grants of special economic privilege underscored the broad 
based support for economic liberty.187 
IX.  THE CONTRACT CLAUSE 
It remains to link the growing free market ideology to the framing of 
the United States Constitution.  The delegates to the Philadelphia 
Convention were to a large degree prompted by the desire to bring about 
a greater protection of economic rights.188  Yet for the most part, 
notwithstanding their dedication to the rights of property owners, the 
Framers initially relied on institutional and political arrangements to 
safeguard individual rights.189  The basic constitutional scheme was to 
 
 183. N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. II, reprinted in 4 FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 182, at 2453–54. 
 184. James W. Ely, Jr., “To Pursue Any Lawful Trade or Avocation”: The 
Evolution of Unenumerated Economic Rights in the Nineteenth Century, 8 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 917, 918–19 (2006). 
 185. Id.  See also FARNAM, supra note 31, at 124–25: 
The general presumption of the bills of rights in the early constitutions and in 
the first eight amendments to the Federal Constitution was in favor of the 
liberty of the individual, and the protection of his property rights against 
arbitrary power on the part of the government.  This in turn created a 
presumption in favor of personal freedom against the subordination of human 
rights to property rights.  It also created a presumption in favor of equality of 
opportunity. 
Id.  
 186. N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § XXIII, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL 
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 182, at 2788. 
 187. Ely, supra note 184, at 931. 
 188. GOTTFRIED DIETZE, AMERICA’S POLITICAL DILEMMA: FROM LIMITED TO 
UNLIMITED DEMOCRACY 66 (1968). 
 189. Wayne McCormack, Lochner, Liberty, Property, and Human Rights, 1 N.Y.U. 
J.L. & LIBERTY 432, 451 (2005) (“The original draftsmen focused on the structure of 
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protect personal and economic liberty through elaborate procedural 
devices—notably, the separation of powers among the branches of the 
federal government.190  Still, many provisions of the original Constitution 
pertain to economic interests.191  A number of these restricted the power 
of the states, whose excesses had done much to trigger the call for a new 
national government.192  The most important of these provisions for our 
purpose was the Contract Clause.193  This Clause best exemplifies the 
Framers’ commitment to economic liberty and warrants a brief exploration. 
To trace the origins of the Contract Clause, we must start by 
considering the troubled economic circumstances of post-Revolutionary 
America.  Attaining independence caused much economic dislocation.194  
It ended the trade restrictions imposed by the English Navigation Acts, 
but also brought about the loss of markets with Great Britain and its 
other colonies.  The Revolution, moreover, generated wholesale interference 
with economic arrangements by state legislatures.  Responding to depressed 
economic conditions following independence, state lawmakers enacted a 
host of debt-relief laws designed to help debtors at the expense of 
creditors.195  Such measures included stays on the collection of debts, laws 
allowing the payment of debts in installments, and statutes authorizing 
the payment of obligations in commodities.196  State lawmakers also 
issued quantities of paper money, and made such paper currency legal 
tender for the payment of debts.197  These laws not only discouraged 
commerce by frustrating the enforcement of contracts but portended 
threats to the security of property generally.  As Chief Justice John 
Marshall recalled, 
The power of changing the relative situation of debtor and creditor, of 
interfering with contracts, a power which comes home to every man, touches 
the interest of all, and controls the conduct of every individual in those things 
 
government out of a belief that diffusion of power among different organs would obviate 
the need for specific guarantees of individual rights.”). 
 190. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 
150–61, 547–62 (1998). 
 191. ELY, supra note 1, at 43–46. 
 192. Id. at 45. 
 193. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 provides in part: “No State shall . . . pass any . . . 
Law impairing the obligation of Contracts . . . .” 
 194. Bruchey, supra note 2, at 1138–39. 
 195. NADELHAFT, supra note 153. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id.; ALLAN NEVINS, THE AMERICAN STATES DURING AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION, 
1775–1789, at 404–05, 537, 571 (1924). 
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which he supposes to be proper for his own exclusive management, had been 
used to such an excess by the state legislatures, as to break in upon the ordinary 
intercourse of society, and destroy all confidence between man and man.  This 
mischief had become so great, so alarming, as not only to impair commercial 
intercourse, and threaten the existence of credit, but to sap the morals of the 
people, and destroy the sanctity of private faith.  To guard against the 
continuance of the evil, was an object of deep interest with all the truly wise, as 
well as the virtuous, of this great community, and was one of the important 
benefits expected from a reform of the government.198 
In short, the bitter post-Revolutionary experience convinced many 
political leaders that state protection of contractual rights was inadequate.199 
The forerunner of the Contract Clause can be found in the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787.200  The Confederation Congress enacted the Ordinance 
in July of that year to provide territorial governance for the area of the 
Old Northwest.  Articulating a number of fundamental principles, the 
Ordinance had much of the character of a constitutional document.201  
The Ordinance contained several important provisions regarding the 
rights of property owners, including one ensuring the sanctity of private 
contracts.  Article 2 of the Ordinance stated: 
And, in the just preservation of rights and property, it is understood and 
declared, that no law ought ever to be made or have force in the said territory, 
that shall, in any manner whatever, interfere with or affect private contracts, or 
engagements, bona fide, and without fraud previously formed.202 
This language was evidently inserted as part of a larger scheme to 
encourage economic development in the largely unsettled territories.  
Viewed in this light, the protection of agreements was a crucial step in 
attracting eastern investors.203  The territorial government was prevented 
from abridging private economic deals, creating a hospitable climate for 
outside capital. 
 
 198. Ogden v. Saunders, 27 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 354–55 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 199. Priest, supra note 132, at 397 (“Fear of the consequences of such 
democratically enacted policies was one of the reasons for including the Contracts 
Clause in the United States Constitution, as a means for the federal courts to regulate 
state legislatures’ debt relief measures.”). 
 200. James W. Ely, Jr., The Marshall Court and Property Rights: A Reappraisal, 33 
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1023, 1030–31 (2000). 
 201. See Denis P. Duffey, Note, The Northwest Ordinance as a Constitutional 
Document, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (1995). 
 202. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. 2, reprinted in 32 JOURNALS OF THE 
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 340 (R. Hill ed., 1936), available at 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwjc.html. 
 203. Andrew R.L. Cayton, The Northwest Ordinance from the Perspective of the 
Frontier, in THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE 1787: A BICENTENNIAL HANDBOOK 1, 8–10 
(Robert M. Taylor, Jr. ed., 1987); Duffey, supra note 201, at 938, 960. 
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Congress enacted the Northwest Ordinance while the Constitutional 
Convention was meeting in Philadelphia.204  In August of 1787, the 
delegates were considering constitutional limitations on the power of the 
states.  Rufus King of Massachusetts moved to insert into the Constitution 
“in the words used in the Ordinance of [Congress] establishing new 
States, a prohibition on the States to interfere in private contracts.”205  
Both the process by which the Contract Clause was adopted as part of 
the Constitution and the intended scope of the Clause have been the 
subject of extensive historical inquiry.206  It is not my purpose to enter 
that debate here.  There was surprisingly little discussion of the Contract 
Clause by the delegates at the Convention given its subsequent 
significance in American constitutionalism.207  The evidence shows that 
the immediate impetus for the Clause was to curb state debtor relief 
measures that undercut the sanctity of contracts and threatened credit 
relationships.208  At the very least, the Framers clearly wished to assure the 
 
 204. Duffey, supra note 201, at 929–30. 
 205. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 439 (Max Farrand 
ed., rev. ed. 1937). 
 206. The classic, if dated, history of the Contract Clause is BENJAMIN FLETCHER 
WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION (1938).  For helpful recent 
studies, see Steven R. Boyd, The Contract Clause and the Evolution of American 
Federalism, 1789–1815, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 529 (1987) and James W. Ely, Jr., Origins 
and Development of the Contract Clause (Apr. 8, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=839904).  Scholars have long debated whether the 
Contract Clause was expected to apply only to private agreements or to public contracts 
by state governments as well.  Compare Ely, supra note 200, at 1029–33 (contending 
that the Marshall Court’s application of the Contract Clause to public as well as private 
agreements was consistent with both the purpose and language of the clause), and 
Douglas W. Kmiec & John O. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the Original 
Understanding, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 539 n.67 (1987) (“A distinction between 
public and private contracts is unwarranted in view of the lack of language limiting the 
application of the Clause to private contracts or similarly limiting discussion at the 
Convention.”), with WRIGHT, supra, at 31–32 (illustrating how the Marshall Court 
expanded application of the Contract Clause beyond objectives of the Framers), and 
Thomas W. Merrill, Public Contracts, Private Contracts, and the Transformation of the 
Constitutional Order, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597, 600 (1987) (arguing that a strong 
case can be made that the Contract Clause “was not thought to impose a general duty on 
state governments to honor their own obligations”). 
 207. WRIGHT, supra note 206, at 9–10. 
 208. Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 703, 72 (1984) (pointing out that the debtor-creditor relationship “was one 
leading concern of the [F]ramers in drafting the clause”). 
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stability of contractual arrangements by preventing state abridgements of 
contracts.209 
It is revealing that the Framers saw contractual rights as sufficiently 
important to warrant a specific ban on state impairment.  By the time of 
the Philadelphia Convention, contracts were widely seen as a vital aspect 
of economic liberty.210  Interference with contracts amounted to an attack on 
private economic ordering.  In addition, contracts also represented an 
increasingly significant type of commercial wealth.211 
Just as the Framers of the Federal Constitution drew upon the 
Northwest Ordinance, so the Federal Constitution and Bill of Rights 
became an influential model for later state constitutions.  In particular, 
many states adopted provisions designed to safeguard the security of 
contracts.  When Pennsylvania and South Carolina revised their fundamental 
laws in 1790, they added a contract clause.  Thus, the Pennsylvania 
Constitution stated “[t]hat no ex post facto law, nor any law impairing 
contracts, shall be made.”212  A large number of the constitutions of the 
newer states followed suit.  The Kentucky Constitution (1792), the Tennessee 
Constitution (1796), the Louisiana Constitution (1812), the Mississippi 
Constitution (1817), the Illinois Constitution (1818), the Alabama 
Constitution (1819), the Missouri Constitution (1820), the Michigan 
Constitution (1835), and the Florida Constitution (1838) all contained a 
clause barring the impairment of contracts.  In addition, the Virginia 
Constitution, as revised in 1830, included a contract clause.  Although 
not all states in the antebellum era adopted a contract clause, enough did 
to reinforce the high standing of contractual rights in the constitutional 
order. 
 
 209. Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 206, at 534 (“[T]he history of the Clause 
suggests that it was aimed at all retrospective, redistributive schemes in violation of 
vested contractual rights, of which debtor relief was merely a prime example.”). 
 210. Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 
453, 537 (1989).   
This was the Federalist effort to link the eighteenth century’s affirmation of 
individual liberty with the rhetoric of contract and private property.  Thus, the 
Federalists valued market “freedom” so highly that they forbade the states from 
“impairing the obligation of Contract” in the original 1787 Constitution, at a 
time when they believed an elaborate Bill of Rights unnecessary.   
Id. 
 211. See HUGHES, supra note 91, at 122–23 (stressing the importance of contracts in 
colonial business transactions); Nelson, supra note 52, at 357–58 (discussing litigation 
over contracts dealing with land, commodities, and servants). 
 212. PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 17, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 182, at 3101. 
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X.  EMERGING CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 
Evidence of the Framers’ thinking with respect to economic liberty 
can be derived from the policies that colonial and state governments 
pursued in the late eighteenth century.  Developments in the legal culture 
were moving unmistakably, albeit unevenly, toward a freer economy.  
The decline of mercantilism, the withering of wage and price controls, 
the pervasive land speculation, the overthrow of the English navigational 
system, and the rise of contracting all pointed toward a new economic 
and legal order.  No doubt the Framers were familiar with these trends 
and most likely approved of them.  These economic liberty tendencies 
informed the constitution-making process and dovetailed with deep 
tenets of Anglo-American constitutional thought. 
Leading political figures of the founding generation drew upon 
currents of constitutional theory and economic philosophy in England.  
English political theorist John Locke had an enormous impact on the 
American concept of constitutionalism.213  A proponent of natural law 
and representative government, Locke famously insisted that the very 
purpose of government was the preservation of “lives, liberties, and 
estates.”214  It is difficult to overestimate Locke’s influence.  “By the late 
eighteenth century,” Pauline Maier has cogently noted, “‘Lockean’ ideas 
on government and revolution were accepted everywhere in America; 
they seemed, in fact, a statement of principles built into English 
constitutional tradition.”215  It followed that the Framers generally adhered 
to the Lockean notion that individual property ownership was a natural 
right with which government had only limited power to interfere. 
The ideas of the Scottish political economist Adam Smith, whose 
landmark treatise, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth 
of Nations, was published in 1776, also had a strong appeal to 
Americans.216  A champion of entrepreneurial freedom and the market 
 
 213. Ellen Frankel Paul, Freedom of Contract and the “Political Economy” of 
Lochner v. New York, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 515, 528–37 (2005) (discussing 
influence of Locke on drafting the U.S. Constitution and state constitutions of the 
Revolutionary era). 
 214. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 178 (Mark Goldie ed., J.M. 
Dent 2000) (1690). 
 215. PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE 87 (1997). 
 216. JAMES L. HUSTON, SECURING THE FRUITS OF LABOR: THE AMERICAN CONCEPT 
OF WEALTH DISTRIBUTION, 1775–1900, at 69–75 (1998) (discussing the affinity between 
Smith and American Revolutionary leaders). 
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economy, Smith urged minimal governmental oversight of economic 
activity.  He stressed the self-adjusting nature of a free-market economy.217  
“Smith and his successors,” one scholar has observed, “explained how 
the ‘invisible hand’ of self-interest in the marketplace produced general 
well-being in the economy and augmented national wealth.”218  Smith’s 
assault on mercantilism did much to hasten its decay.219  Although neither 
the Framers nor the general public embraced a strict laissez-faire policy 
sometimes associated with Smith, the new nation had largely a free 
market economy grounded on economic liberty. 
Important members of the founding generation underscored this 
commitment to economic freedom.  James Madison, for instance, commented 
at length on the relationship between property ownership, the economy, 
and the Constitution.  In the famous tenth essay in The Federalist, he 
maintained that extending the sphere of the proposed new national 
government would prevent any interest group from gaining control and 
invading the rights of others.  “[A] rage for paper money, for an abolition of 
debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or 
wicked project,” Madison declared, “will be less apt to pervade the whole 
body of the Union, than a particular member of it . . . .”220  For purposes of 
this article, Madison’s theory of broad representation as a way to diffuse 
interest group pressure is less important than his strong disapproval of 
contractual interference and property redistribution by government, both 
described as “improper and wicked.”  Madison regarded redistributive 
schemes as not only foolish policy but also as violative of liberty.  He 
was especially concerned about interferences with contractual transactions 
because they were less apparent than outright confiscation and were 
therefore more dangerous.  To make his views more explicit, Madison 
stated that “laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the 
first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound 
 
 217. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 193 (2d ed. 
2006). 
 218. HUSTON, supra note 216, at 69–70. 
 219. Lars G. Magnusson, Mercantilism, in A COMPANION TO THE HISTORY OF 
ECONOMIC THOUGHT 47 (Warren J. Samuels et al. eds., 2003) (analyzing Smith’s critique 
of the mercantile system); William D. Grampp, The Liberal Elements in English 
Mercantilism, 66 Q.J. ECON. 465, 465 (1952): 
It is also customary to describe mercantilism as the antithesis of liberal, or classical, 
economic doctrine.  Adam Smith used some of his strongest invective against 
it, and since his time mercantilism has been thoroughly condemned by liberal 
economists because its practices were the very kind of interference which they 
always have regarded as useless, unwise, or mischievous. 
 220. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 49 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992). 
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legislation.”221  He pictured the Contract Clause as a “bulwark in favor 
of personal security and private rights.”222 
As a member of the first Congress, Madison took the lead in 
formulating the Bill of Rights.223  He included protection for the rights of 
property owners in his proposals, and two important guarantees were 
incorporated in the Fifth Amendment, along with procedural safeguards 
for criminal trials.224  The Fifth Amendment explicitly reflected the Lockean 
view that protection of property was a chief aim of government.  
Madison thought of property as imposing a limit on the power of 
government, thereby allowing a large area for private economic ordering. 
Madison’s commitment to economic liberty was underscored in his 
famous 1792 essay, Property.225  Here, Madison broadly defined property 
to encompass freedom of expression and religious liberty as well as 
possessions.226  Reflecting his aversion to special economic privileges, 
he stressed the right of individuals to follow vocations of their choice: 
That is not a just government, nor is property secure under it, where arbitrary 
restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies deny to part of its citizens that free use 
of their faculties, and free choice of their occupations, which not only constitute 
their property in the general sense of the word; but are the means of acquiring 
property strictly so called.  What must be the spirit of legislation where a 
manufacturer of linen cloth is forbidden to bury his own child in a linen shroud, 
in order to favour his neighbour who manufactures woolen cloth; where the 
manufacturer and wearer of woolen cloth are again forbidden the oeconomical 
[sic] use of buttons of that material, in favor of the manufacturer of buttons of 
other materials!227 
As this suggests, Madison saw one’s ability to acquire property as an 
inherent aspect of personal liberty.228  To restrict the right to acquire 
property was in effect to limit individual liberty.  According to Jennifer 
Nedelsky, Madison believed that government should “ensure the free 
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exercise of the faculties of acquisition by preventing unwarranted or 
discriminatory restrictions on this freedom.”229  Government, in other 
words, was not just to protect the existing rights of owners but to 
preserve opportunity. 
This is not to say that Madison ruled out all governmental regulations 
of property.  He left room for the states to promote and control economic 
behavior, but he opposed both monopoly privilege and redistributive 
schemes that helped some at the expense of others.230 
There is no way to determine the extent to which Madison’s views 
were representative of the Framers as a whole.  But considering his key 
role in drafting the Constitution and Bill of Rights, it is appropriate to 
give special weight to his understanding of economic rights.  Madison, 
moreover, left a lasting imprint on American constitutionalism.  As 
Nedelsky observed, 
[T]he notion that property and contract were essential ingredients of the liberty 
the Constitution was to protect, was common to Madison, Marshall, and the 
twentieth-century advocates of laissez-faire.  And the idea that property and 
contract could define the legitimate scope of governmental power was a basic 
component of constitutionalism from 1787 to 1937.231 
Certainly, Alexander Hamilton shared Madison’s distaste for legislative 
abridgement of contractual rights.  Seen by some historians as the author 
of the Contract Clause, Hamilton pictured laws abridging contractual 
obligations as “atrocious breaches of moral obligation and social justice.”232  
He stressed the utilitarian role of contracts in commercial life.  In The 
Federalist, for example, Hamilton stated: “Laws in violation of private 
contracts . . . amount to aggressions on the rights of those States, whose 
citizens are injured by them . . . .”233  In his mind, state laws impairing 
contracts would negatively impact the flow of commerce among the 
states.  Speaking of the various restrictions on state power in Article 10, 
Section 10 of the Constitution, Hamilton hailed “the precautions against 
the repetition of those practices on the part of the state governments, 
which have undermined the foundations of property and credit . . . .”234  
Following ratification of the Constitution, Hamilton urged a broad 
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reading of the Contract Clause to encompass state legislation impairing a 
state’s own obligations.235 
Hamilton was not an adherent of a laissez-faire philosophy.  As Secretary 
of the Treasury, he proposed an ambitious program of protective tariffs 
and subsidies to encourage economic growth.236  He also successfully 
recommended that Congress charter a national bank—a hybrid institution 
largely under private control—to stabilize the currency.237  Yet Hamilton 
was familiar with the work of Adam Smith and was a forceful supporter 
of a market economy based on private property and security of contracts.238  
Although he saw room for government to promote business, he declared 
in 1801, “In matters of industry, human enterprise ought, doubtless, to 
be left free in the main, not fettered by too much regulation.”239 
Other evidence of the likely intention of the Framers is provided by 
James Wilson.  He had been heavily involved in the controversy over the 
repeal of the charter of the Bank of North America.240  In 1785, at the 
behest of radicals and agrarians, the Pennsylvania legislature revoked the 
charter of the bank.241  Wilson argued at length against this step, likening 
the charter to a contract.242  He maintained that state legislatures could 
not abridge contracts.  As Nedelsky noted: “Not only did [Wilson] think 
that upholding contracts was extremely important economically, he saw 
the obligation of contract as part of the fundamental obligation to fulfill 
promises which makes society possible.”243 
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XI.  CONCLUSION 
The economic values embraced by the Constitution and Bill of Rights 
are hotly contested.244  Is the principle of economic liberty built into the 
Constitution and Bill of Rights—and to what extent—or is the Constitution 
simply neutral regarding economic issues?  It bears emphasis that there 
was a consensus among the Framers that property and contractual rights 
should be protected.245  These were seen as essential to achieve both 
political liberty and the advantages of a market economy.  The Framers 
crafted the provisions in the Constitution and Bill of Rights to guarantee 
economic rights. 
The historical record stops short of establishing that the Framers 
expected the Constitution to embody a particular theory, such as laissez-
faire, but it does not follow that the Constitution was entirely neutral 
with respect to economic rights.  Property and contractual rights were 
assigned a high value by the Framers, and were protected by language in 
the Constitution and Bill of Rights.  Legislators were free to fashion 
economic policy so long as they respected these bedrock rights.  
Lawmakers, therefore, did not have carte blanche to devise policies that 
infringed property and contractual rights.  Although there is room to 
debate—as people did at the time of the founding—which legislative 
acts and regulations violate such rights, one can fairly conclude that the 
Framers envisioned a substantially free market economy with a large 
measure of economic liberty for individuals to pursue their own interest.  
“Federalists proposed, in sum,” Kermit L. Hall and Peter Karsten cogently 
observe, “to place the new land in the mainstream of acquisitive 
capitalism.”246  Moreover, as Joyce Appleby reminds us, the ascendancy 
of a market culture following the Revolution “took place in the United 
States under circumstances that forged a powerful link between political 
and economic freedom.”247 
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